

Election Insecurity in Social Media Campaigns: An Analysis of the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election

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Abstract :

This article describes changes in campaign patterns and the mobilization of political support through online media. This shift in campaign strategy presents an opportunity for competing political groups to be more innovative in their use of digital media tools. Political contestation necessitates the availability of alternative sources of information beyond mainstream media. The issue is that social media, which allows individuals to autonomously convey political views and calls to action, carries the risk of political vulnerability due to hate speech and misinformation. This paper employs a qualitative method that explains the data through content analysis based on Norman Fairclough's model of Critical Discourse Analysis, which emphasizes text, practice, and socio-cultural analysis. The primary sources for this article are documents related to the evolving patterns of presidential election contestation in online media and activities interpreting political contestation. The results of the socio-cultural analysis reveal that the voting public in the presidential election tends to acquire knowledge of diversity through social media rather than through direct mobilization, which may contribute to increased tensions in Indonesia's political contestation.

Keywords: *social media, contestation, politics, mobilization, conflict*

Abstrak:

Artikel ini menggambarkan perubahan pola kampanye dan mobilisasi dukungan politik di melalui media online. Perubahan strategi kampanye tersebut memberikan peluang bagi kelompok-kelompok politik yang berkontestasi untuk lebih kreatif memanfaatkan instrumen media. Kontestasi politik sangat membutuhkan ketersediaan alternatif sumber-sumber informasi di luar media mainstream. Persoalannya, pemanfaatan media sosial yang sangat otonom bagi individu untuk menyampaikan pandangan dan ajakan politik, memiliki potensi kerawanan politik akibat adanya ujaran kebencian dan pelintiran kebenaran. Tulisan ini menggunakan metode kualitatif yang menjelaskan data dengan metode analisis isi menggunakan teori *critical discourse analysis* model Norman Fairclough, yang menitikberatkan pada analisis teks, praktik, dan sosial kultural. Sumber utama artikel ini adalah dokumen-dokumen terkait pergeseran pola kontestasi pemilihan presiden di media online dan aktivitas interpretasi kontestasi politik. Hasil analisis sosiokultural menjelaskan bahwa situasi masyarakat pemilih dalam pemilihan presiden memiliki kecenderungan mengambil pengetahuan keberagaman melalui media sosial daripada mobilisasi langsung, sehingga berpotensi memunculkan konflik dalam kontestasi politik di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: *media sosial, kontestasi, politik, mobilisasi, konflik*

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INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of national and local politics in Indonesia following the 2019 elections continue to impact societal divisions. These divisions, which influence the identity construction of political opponents and allies, are at least partly influenced by the intensity of communication in digital spaces. Social media platforms like YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, X, and various other digital media portals have amplified the potential for political identity division (Aminulloh et al., 2025). This fragmentation within the voting community highlights that the stigma surrounding the social trichotomy, which categorizes students as *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan*, remains prevalent (Khamdan, 2022). These divisions may persist due to the generally low level of digital literacy among much of the population.

The public's use of social media, including both officially registered winning team accounts and individual accounts, illustrates a robust picture of public participation. The democratic process fosters effective and fair participation, along with a space for open contestation as guaranteed by the state (Dahl, 1971). These two conditions make general elections (*Pemilu*) one of the most effective instruments of democracy in the world: participation and contestation.

The journey of democracy, which guarantees fair participation and contestation, ultimately conveys that individuals and groups must coexist with both political allies and opponents. The issue is that a paradigm has emerged in which politics is increasingly treated as a matter of winning and losing rather than right and wrong. The dilemma within democratic contestation is the emphasis on victory, which can foster individual and group fanaticism, often accompanied by claims of possessing the absolute truth (Santoso et al., 2024). Truth claims may consist of facts that can be verified through credible data and sources. Conversely, truth claims can also arise from differing data interpretations, leading to controversy and political debate. Such divergent interpretations influence the rise of hate spin and hate speech (Vasist et al., 2024). Social media, as an open public space, has emerged as a new phenomenon in global politics because it serves as an effective medium for voter mobilization.

Social media offers a vast opportunity to articulate political aspirations while combating opposing political forces. This political articulation has influenced the struggle for influence, leading to the emergence of new forms of political activism in Indonesia (Intyaswati & Fairuzza, 2023). Social media has emerged as an effective tool for changing frames and accelerating the spread of discourse and movements. Advances in information and communication technology have impacted the rise of movements for change as well as efforts to maintain power, supported by rapid shifts in public patterns of thought and perception (Mahoney & Tang, 2024).

The DKI Jakarta regional elections in 2017, for instance, became a political contest heavily influenced by the use of social media by both successful teams and their supporting masses. The Anies-Sandi volunteers, who adopted the tagline of unity, faced off against the Friends of Ahok-Djarot volunteers, who embraced the tagline of diversity. Polarization in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election has

strengthened the contestation between Islamist and nationalist groups, as well as fuelled the stigmatization of Salafist groups by liberal circles. The polarization and stigmatization were intensified and disseminated through social media and certain Islamic study groups (Khamdan et al., 2024a). Similarly, the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections sparked political movements through volunteerism on social media, marked by hashtag battles such as "KMPret" versus "Cebong" and *Kadrun* versus *Kirdun*. This reality renders elections susceptible to the political divisions present in society (Bawaslu, 2023).

One-way political intolerance in Indonesia manifests itself through mutual attacks on social media. This trend can be understood through the competition of hashtags (#) that escalate into declarations of support in the real world (Dharma et al., 2023). Hashtags are phrases or words without spaces created to facilitate the classification or grouping of content, making the content search process easier. The effect of grouping content with metadata certainly broadens the reach of posts on social media. Phrases with the hashtags *Kadrun*, *Kampret*, and *Cebong* gained prominence after the Nasdem Party announced Anies Rasyid Baswedan as its presidential candidate on October 3, 2022.

Elections serve as a vital political mechanism to uphold and advance democracy within a nation. They reflect that sovereignty rests with the people, exercised through a functional representative system (Khamdan, 2022). As such, any threat to participation or fair competition in elections must be addressed with practical strategies to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. One important approach involves proactively managing the risks of digital platforms, particularly social media. During regional elections, spreading hate speech and misinformation can severely undermine democratic processes. Implementing preventative measures to monitor and restrict harmful campaign content is crucial. These efforts safeguard the integrity of elections and contribute valuable insights for developing a comprehensive Election Vulnerability Index in the future. By identifying patterns and sources of online political disruption, stakeholders can strengthen democratic resilience and promote more transparent, inclusive electoral practices across all regions.


METHOD

This study adopts a qualitative research approach to explore how social media was used for political mobilization during Indonesia's 2024 presidential election. It focuses on how political contestation manifested through identity construction and the stigmatization of opposing groups, often expressed via cyberbullying. These online behaviors contributed to the spread of hate speech and the manipulation of facts. The study draws on perspectives from political sociology and political psychology to analyze this phenomenon, using critical discourse analysis as its main methodological framework.

This study employs content analysis guided by Norman Fairclough's model of critical discourse analysis, which explores three key dimensions: textual, discursive practice, and socio-cultural context (Durmaz & Yogun, 2022). The analysis focuses on identifying patterns and structures of communication and interpreting the meanings embedded in various codes, symbols, and messages through qualitative and quantitative approaches. The research process involves several stages: breaking down the data, comparing information, categorizing and classifying content, and connecting

datasets to address the research questions and draw meaningful conclusions (Bungin, 2005).

Figure 1. Norman Fairclough's CDA Analysis Thinking Framework



RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Result

In 2018, Daily Social collaborated with the *Jakpat* Mobile Survey Platform to survey 2,032 smartphone users from various regions. The survey reveals a vulnerability to receiving fake news or hoaxes. A total of 82.25 percent of respondents reported encountering fake news on Facebook, 56.55 percent on WhatsApp, and 29.48 percent on Instagram (Khamdan, 2022). The survey indicates that political and SARA issues predominantly influence the type of fake news, manipulating emotional sentiments to influence the acceptance or evaluation of information's truthfulness. One of the contributors to the creation and spread of fake news is often referred to as a buzzer.

The existence of JASMEV volunteers (Jokowi Ahok Social Media Volunteers) is often regarded as the prototypical model for buzzers in Indonesia. JASMEV was established on August 12, 2012, coinciding with the DKI Jakarta Regional Election contestation. Political competition through social media emerged as a trend during the 2012 DKI Jakarta regional election (Utomo, 2013). The political rivalry between the Jokowi – Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, also known as Ahok, heavily relied on JASMEV volunteers led by Kartika Djoemadi. Each volunteer was free to express their opinions, complemented by standard themes from the Cyrus Network Team in managing the Jokowi-Ahok war room, which was coordinated by Hasan Hasbi Batupahat. Approximately 15,000 individuals served as volunteers, spread across RT and RW levels, with 706 coordinators and 42 strategy supervisors (Khamdan & Wiharyani, 2018).

The success of JASMEV volunteers in the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election (*Pilgub*) in 2012 was replicated in the 2014 presidential election. At least 1,248 volunteer

organizations were recorded in the 2014 presidential election contest, which brought together the competition between Jokowi-JK and Prabowo-Sandi (Arianto, 2014). As a new model of political engagement, these volunteers effectively influenced public opinion and voting behaviour. However, the dynamics of image-building through social media have an impact on the phenomenon of conflict among volunteers, which leads to hateful political propaganda.

Hate speech, manifested through smear campaigns and negative messaging, is notably effective in establishing a damaging stigma. This stigma relates to physical defects, compromised character, and SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, intergroup) issues (Goffman, 1986). The core purpose of black and negative campaigns is to foster a negative perception or stigma within society regarding certain candidates engaged in political contests. Three voter models influence political decision-making (Higashikata, 2015). *First*, the sociological model is shaped by common factors such as religion, ethnicity, age, gender, education, and income, making issues of religious and ethnic identity frequently employed as mobilization strategies. *Second*, the psychological model is significantly affected by perceptions of the candidate's character, campaign themes, and political parties, commonly referred to as partisanship or party identification (Party ID) (Mujani et al., 2012). *Third*, the rational model is typically assessed through an economic lens based on profit considerations, where political parties make offers that are evaluated by voters (Downs, 1957). The campaign strategy of creating stigma and promoting hate speech is designed to sway individuals' political choices, particularly those potential voters who remain undecided before the election period, similar to these voting models.


Three pairs of candidates were contesting in the 2024 presidential election. The first pair comprised Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, supported by the change coalition made up of Nasdem, PKB, and PKS. The second pair featured a duet between Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who have named their coalition the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM), consisting of Gerindra, Demokrat, Golkar, and PAN. The third pair included Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD, who were supported by PDIP and PPP. Buzzers continued to propagate hate speech and spin, acting as unofficial, formless volunteers.

Several volunteers supporting Jokowi and those backing Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election have collaborated to form a unified team for the 2024 presidential election. Volunteers tasked with managing social media, for instance, were organized by the Prabowo National Volunteers - Gibran Digital Team (Pride). The Pride volunteers utilized social media to transform the image of Prabowo Subianto, who was seen as firm and expressive during the 2019 presidential election, into a cool and endearing figure through the political advertisement "Prabowo Gibran *Memang Istimewa*." This advertisement, uploaded to the Gerindra Party's YouTube account on December 13, 2023, has garnered 1,156,663 views as of March 15, 2024.

The Instagram account @gerindra uploaded a 26-second video of Prabowo dancing in public on September 21, 2023. As of December 15, 2023, the post had received 304,765 likes and 9,335 comments on Instagram. On the Gerindra Party TikTok account @partaigerindra, which has the same viewing period as the YouTube account, the video was viewed by 5 million people, garnered 604,600 likes, was reshared 20,400 times, and received 18,900 comments. Videos of Prabowo dancing with smiling gestures were widely used as responses and comments to negative news

on various social media by volunteers. Accompanying *Gemoy* videos and images, the capitalized phrase "DIFITNAH TETAP SANTAI" circulated widely. See the graph below:

Graph 1. Social Media Engagement for Prabowo's '*Gemoy*' Dance Video



Prabowo at least succeeded in rebranding politics by calling a smile Gerindra's weapon against bad news that cornered him, or the "power smile". Prabowo's *Gemoy* video, which was first uploaded on TikTok on October 26, 2023, had been viewed by 443,300 people by December 16, 2023, and received 52,300 likes and 2,543 comments. In another instance, the video focusing on memory is entitled "Is it permissible to be this *gemoy*?" It was uploaded on November 2, 2023, and went viral. *Gemoy*'s video has been viewed by more than 9.9 million people, with 1.3 million likes as of December 16, 2023.

The campaign message strongly emphasized by the Prabowo-Gibran pair was the *Gemoy* association, glorified through *gemoy* dancing and posters with artificial intelligence animated designs reminiscent of children's cartoons. Prabowo's clothing style has evolved from previous presidential election contests. The former Kopassus Commander, who was known for always wearing white *safari* clothes, has now transformed into a sky-blue Apollos shirt. This strategy certainly carries a symbolic interactionist meaning for the voting public, indicating that Prabowo-Gibran has adapted to appeal to the youth. The Sky-Blue identity has been massively promoted through e-commerce platforms to commercialize volunteers and the winning team.

Social media is a highly effective medium for quickly disseminating information and building political branding compared to other competitors. The content used by the winning team, volunteers, and Prabowo-Gibran candidates tends to be informal and appears humorous. The emergence of terms like "starfruit," "folic acid," and "samsul" actually originated from this account's post. The cyber war targeting Gibran was met with laughter at his own expense.

Gibran and the winning team, such as the *Bocahe Mase* Volunteers in Central

Java, actively engaged with criticisms and comments on social media informally and humorously. Political communication mechanisms on social media emphasize boosting the symbols and identity of the millennial generation through lighthearted and informal messaging. Strong framing to create differentiation is crucial in shaping public perception and support. As the youngest candidate, Gibran was even considered "not old enough" to participate in the contest, highlighting his genuine youthfulness and innocence.

The use of images and videos on social media for political contestation is defined by Gen Z and millennials, who favor informality. Users of TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube are primarily young people categorized as first-time voters. Engaging political expressions significantly influence young people's participation in politics. This is evident from the numerous Prabowo-Gibran volunteers, who are predominantly young individuals and social media influencers. Campaign content infused with entertainment, joy, and relatable family themes is favored by young people and social media users, leading to frequent re-shares. The level of virality, measured by the number of likes, views, comments, and shares, undoubtedly impacts the candidate's popularity.

Buzzer's success in functioning as a political communicator is influenced by several factors. *First*, the buzzers effectively utilize the features of new media, particularly social media, to sway first-time voters and undecided individuals (swing voters). For instance, buzzers who are JASMEV volunteers are brought together through updates and independent registration via the www.jasmev.com portal. Psychologically, they feel a sense of closeness to political candidates through the provision of e-certificates signed by the candidate pairs.

Secondly, electoral success depends on a flexible yet structured information system. Buzzer showcases volunteers who utilize social media platforms, like JASMEV and Pride volunteers, who no longer rely on a single source for the winning team. The adaptability of these volunteers can shape new issues that receive swift responses. This can lead to the reactive dissemination of information or content that supports the candidate, including the immediate execution of counterattacks to localize issues harmful to the candidate.

Third, the competition for support through mass communication is greatly influenced by the success of engaging public participation. Buzzers or social media volunteers are granted freedom, making them unamenable to election monitoring. At least, they manifest as a new power. Voluntary politics through formless networks and unregistered social networks with the winning team, have emerged as a tool of resistance against an imperfect political system.

Community fragmentation strengthened after Gerindra and PDIP clashed over candidate nominations for the 2024 presidential election. Prabowo Subianto, as Chair of the Gerindra Board of Trustees, and Megawati, as Chair of the PDIP, were once united during the 2009 Presidential Election through the Batu Tulis Agreement. Jokowi and Gibran Rakabuming Raka did not announce their resignation from PDIP membership until the presidential election took place. Conversely, PDIP also did not dismiss or revoke Jokowi and Gibran's party membership.

Volunteer activism is often highly competitive. The massive mobilization of opinions in both mass media and social media by the winning team and social media volunteers, or buzzers, has led to a rise in irrational supporters. Additionally, several

survey institutions act as "covert" political consultants, thus demonstrating partisanship. This is done by inaccurately capturing voter preferences. The societal basis from certain economic levels or strata, higher education, majority and minority ethnic groups, specific religions, and age groups as a population sample is under-represented (Muhtadi, 2019). Surveys conducted by several institutions often contribute to stigmatization and efforts to shape candidates' images.

The 2024 presidential election has highlighted the role of mass media as a tool for constructing political identities. Anis Baswedan, identified as the candidate with the least funding, utilized the YouTube platform with the show "*Desak Anies*," while Ganjar Pranowo organized a series of campaign events titled "*Ganjar Nginap* in Residents' Houses." According to a campaign popularity survey conducted by the Paradigma Institute in Central Java from January 1-15, 2024, 65.3% of respondents were aware of *Joged Gemoy*, 19.8% recognized the *Ganjar Nginap* event, and 14.9% were familiar with *Desak Anies*.

The close relationship between regional authorities and public support in the 2024 presidential election has led political parties to maneuver in two directions during the legislative elections. Several political parties engage in two-legged politics by nominating candidates for governor-deputy governor, or vice regent-deputy regent without necessarily relying on the previous national presidential election coalition. Some political parties view the coalition's consistency in nominating candidates for the 2024 regional elections as detrimental. The political prestige of 2024, as seen in the DKI and Banten gubernatorial elections, suggests that, in terms of seat calculations and specific threshold vote ratios, Prabowo's political camp has emerged victorious through the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) Plus.

The split support is influenced by rationality, particularly in the realm of political money profits. Political money transactions are no longer stigmatized as bad practices; instead, they have gained a positive perception in several regions of Indonesia. These transactions, with their various methods and practices, have undergone a shift in perception in every political contest. The term NPWP, or "*Nomer Piro, Wani Piro*," has developed among the voting public in Indonesia. For instance, in Central Java, there is a 50.9 percent tolerance for money politics. Additionally, 46.6 percent of the population in Banten and East Java also exhibit a tolerant view of money politics. Based on these figures, money politics is viewed as a common practice (Muhtadi, 2020).

The Prabowo-Gibran coalition marked a departure from the political norms of Central Javanese society, which typically unite the *abangan* and *santri* groups to form the Green-Red coalition. In the 2024 presidential election, Prabowo-Gibran achieved victory in Central Java with 12,096,454 votes, accounting for 53.08 percent. The candidate endorsed by PDIP for Central Java's political leadership, Ganjar-Mahfud, earned 7,827,335 votes, or 34.35 percent, while Anies-Muhaimin received 2,866,373 votes, representing 12.58 percent. The significant vote difference between Prabowo-Gibran and Ganjar-Mahfud underscored a new reality: Central Java, acting as a "*bullpen*," struggles to support national-level candidates, even though they may continue to succeed at the local level, including in district and city DPRD as well as Provincial DPRD.

PDIP has established itself as the winner in Central Java in the post-New Order legislative elections. Since 1999, PDIP has consistently won the most seats in the 1999,

2004, 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2024 elections. Central Java is the region with the third largest population, following West Java and East Java. A total of 35 districts or cities form administrative regions, divided into 10 electoral districts, with 32 districts/cities serving as PDIP strongholds. The regional head contests have also reinforced PDIP's dominance by securing victories in every election period. However, Ganjar-Mahfud, as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates from PDIP, suffered defeat in the 2024 presidential election.

Ethnographically, the people of Central Java can collectively be referred to as Javanese. These ethnographic conditions significantly influence the strong Javanese cultural tradition in politics, exemplified by the "*ewuh-pakewuh*" attitude. The voting public in Central Java demonstrates considerable loyalty to the PDIP elite, particularly regarding the incumbent candidate from within the PDIP. The PDIP has governed Central Java since the first direct regional elections were conducted. The direct gubernatorial election on June 22, 2008, resulted in victory for the Bibit Waluyo-Rustriningsih pair, who were endorsed by the PDIP. During the gubernatorial election period held on May 26, 2013, the PDIP again secured a win with the pair Ganjar Pranowo-Heru Sudjatmoko. In the 2018 contest, Ganjar Pranowo, in collaboration with Taj Yasin Maimoen, achieved victory by the PDIP's nomination.

The strategy of encircling support was implemented by a team of volunteers and the Prabowo-Gibran winning team, which recruited several *kyai* and Islamic students. Various figures from the Central Java *Nahdlatul Ulama* (PWNU) Regional Management, for instance, established many winning teams outside of the main team structure during the 2024 presidential election contest. The shift in political support seen in the 2014, 2019, and 2024 presidential elections happened after changes in the configuration of political party coalitions at the national level. For example, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya became a central figure in mobilizing the community in the western coastal region of Central Java with the emergence of the "*Nderek Dawuh Guru*" volunteer team, also known as *Ndaru* volunteers.

The disparity in results between the DPR/DPRD elections and the 2024 presidential election in Central Java reinforced the tradition of divided political loyalties. The configuration of patronage and loyalty among PDIP voters can be influenced by the practice of money politics, which has shifted in perception to something more positive or normalized. Additionally, patronage in the form of personal networks can be reconfigured through the use of social media, which crafts a new image for the Prabowo-Gibran couple. The primordial character or political rationality based on gains from money politics is notably more susceptible among individuals in impoverished conditions and with low educational backgrounds (Vicente, 2013). This presents a deeply ironic reality, as conditions of poverty and low education remain prevalent in the Central Java region.

Discussion

Political Mobilization and Potential General Election Vulnerability

Political mobilization is a process that influences individuals and communities to identify and join a specific collective identity. This strategy led to the creation of an "us and them" or "friend and enemy" identity, significantly shaped by the emergence of a shared sense of enmity. Political mobilization that distinguishes between "friend and foe" can be examined through at least two models: vertical and horizontal

mobilization (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002; Hu, 2024; Kosim, et. al., 2023).

Vertical political mobilization occurs by building relationships within top-down structures and vice versa. Meanwhile, horizontal political mobilization aims to strengthen voter loyalty and political orientation. These two mobilization models underscore the significance of political accommodation toward the interests of the parties based on the types of political participants (Rush & Althoft, 2008). There are at least ten types of participant models for accommodation politics: participants who occupy political positions, those seeking political positions, active members of political parties, passive members of political parties (Pajares, 2023), active members of semi-political organizations, passive members of semi-political organizations, participants in mass actions, participants in internal political discussions, voters, and apathetic participants. These models shape the necessary communication strategy because a greater scope of political participation usually corresponds to a lower intensity of mobilization needed.

The incorrect mapping of potential voters, for example, actually undermines the mobilization efforts. This reality is exploited by brokers who coordinate certain interest groups through the payment of voter votes. Brokers, formalized as success teams, primarily relied on personal connections to offer opinions in a structured, systematic, and extensive manner (Brendan, 2015). In this context, buzzers or social media volunteers play the role of political mobilizers, which may create vulnerabilities in the election process.

The condition of the Indonesian political system, which still maintains a disconnect between candidates and potential voters, or electoral disconnect, is one reason why buzzer practices no longer consider the domino effect of the social media content used (Lim, 2012). The widespread presence of social media volunteers, who are not officially recognized as part of the winning team, ultimately influences the formation of loyalty relationships based solely on political irrationality or mass psychological games. Therefore, the mobilization construct can be described in three dimensions.

First, there is religious mobilization. Religious sentiment in the political process helps build positive perceptions as part of a collective identity within society (Khamdan et al., 2024). The role of religious sentiment in the presidential election contests of 2014, 2019, and 2024 can be understood through various expressions of faith, including doctrine, worship practices or rituals, thoughts on religious figures, religious institutions, legal systems, and the behaviors or emotions of religious individuals. Therefore, the contestation of the 2024 presidential election tends not to utilize religious sentiments since each pair of candidates presents elements of a winning team or religiously based volunteers. This religious mobilization encompasses the engagement of doctrine, worship practices, religious figures, religious institutions, and emotional appeals related to faith.

The mobilization of doctrine in contestation occurs in the practice of Friday prayers. Sermons during these prayers often serve as discourse, leveraging a strategic mass base that organizes independently. The Friday sermon is an essential part of the prayer experience; thus, under any circumstances, the congregation must listen. The nature of political sermons in Friday prayers, often highlighted through social media, significantly influences the emergence of social movements and conflicts (Tarrow, 2005). The mobilization of religion through the practice of worship in the 2024 contest,

as well as the glorification of Prabowo-Gibran's piety, is noteworthy. This is linked to the practices of pilgrimages and prayer meetings associated with Habib Lutfi bin Yahya, a supporter of Prabowo-Gibran. Mobilization through instruments of worship was executed by Prabowo Subianto's supporters by organizing a congregational morning prayer movement. This movement, titled "Indonesia's Great Dawn," served as a strategy to consolidate support through mosques across Indonesia.

Second, ethnic mobilization is viewed as a social group sharing a specific identity. It serves as a strategy for establishing suitable political differentiation. The competition in the 2024 presidential election, for instance, illustrates ethnic rivalry among the candidates. Anies Rasyid Baswedan, of Arab Hadhrami descent from Yemen, was targeted by attacks that claimed he was not a native Indonesian (Khamdan et al., 2024). In both local and national elections, groups with varying political views intensify the political struggle between the Chinese ethnic minority and the Arab ethnic minority (Scott, 2000). Anies Rasyid Baswedan, representing the Arab Hadhrami diaspora in Indonesia, successfully secured nominations from Nasdem and PKB. Ethnic commodification has led to the phenomenon of misidentification through the emergence of new identities, alongside the ongoing debate over the legality of the Ba'alawi lineage.

Third, capital mobilization occurs among those who hold political and wealth capital. The fragmentation of society, supported by divisive politics, can easily be manipulated or altered by a small group that simultaneously controls wealth and power. This group later became better known as the oligarchs. The dominance of wealth and power holders influences the potential for violence from investors or capital-generated violence.

Democratization involves reclaiming public space from discrimination and the alienation of power, which power holders tend to manipulate to create stigma, such as in discussions surrounding radicalism during presidential elections or other forms of hate speech. Hate speech encompasses speech, writing, actions, and activities aimed at inciting violence and fostering negative prejudice. This series of actions seeks to influence harmful stigma toward an individual or group. Additionally, hate spin is defined as a political strategy that manages inflammatory communications, offenses, and insults by intensifying emotions related to specific political identities.

CONCLUSION

Movements to garner political support during general election contests are increasingly popular on social media. Many celebrities have expressed their endorsement of general election candidates through these platforms. The social media utilized by winning campaign teams and political volunteers often centers around identity issues. This focus on identity is effective as a framing tool for developing movement issues because it resonates easily with the psychobiographical aspects of political candidates. However, this strategy has also led to a rise in hate speech and identity-based sentiments. There is a need for an organized, registered volunteer team to serve as a basis for addressing election violations. Currently, there is no legal framework to hold buzzers or social media volunteers accountable during political contests; ultimately, they rely solely on reporting under the Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE) Law.

Psychobiography is a crucial factor for voters who emphasize emotional and

sociological elements. In this context, engaging the mass base through social media effectively links the psychological awareness and empathy of potential voters towards political candidates. The competition between political parties and civil society encompasses not only the struggle for power in presidential and regional head elections but also revolves around an ongoing cycle of control. The current political contestation involves three main aspects: strategies for gaining and establishing power structures, strategies for exercising authority, and strategies for overseeing the flow of power. Politics after the 2024 presidential election, for instance, has created a new pattern of national politics dominated by oligarchs with significant capital and substantial influence.

Political contestations that require significant resources in the mobilization process need regulations to simplify and minimize political costs. Financing political parties and electoral contests, which are the state's responsibility, can at least diminish transactional practices in each election. Sanctions for revoking political rights for a duration of two elections concerning politicians or party members who have completed sentences for corruption will certainly impact the selection process for cadres and potential leaders.

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